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INTRODUCTION
While the use of the authority device within individual states has burgeoned in
recent years, there has been no significant increase in its use by two or more states
jointly. Indeed, although interstate action has been used more and more frequently
since World War II by groups of states to provide for joint attack on a wide variety
of problems,' few interstate authorities have been created. As of this writing, there
are only six true interstate authorities in the United States:
The Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission
The Delaware River Port Authority
The Lake Champlain Bridge Commission
The Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority
The Port of New York Authority
The Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission
Except for the two port authorities, none of them amount to much. The Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge Commission, for example, until it became inactive two years ago,
operated a ferry across the Mississippi River at Tiptonville, Tennessee, and employed
less than a dozen men for this purpose. The Lake Champlain Bridge Commission
operates two highway bridges and is studying the possibility of erecting a third over
Lake Champlain. It employs only about a dozen men in its operations, and in
Fiscal Year 1959 received $i8i,i55.I0 in tolls, of which it expended $85,995.30? The
Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority operates a motor and rail-
road bridge over the Piscataqua River between Kittery, Maine, and Portsmouth,
New Hampshire. It has around twenty full-time and ten part-time employees, and,
in Fiscal Year i96o, it operated on a budget of $154,200.15. Its total receipts from tolls
and rent during the same period were $574,o1744Y The bonded indebtedness out-
standing of the three authorities combined is only slightly over $2,oooooo.
The Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission is a somewhat larger opera-
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tion. It has jurisdiction over IIo miles of waterfront in the Delaware River valley,
and maintains and operates five toll bridges and thirteen free bridges crossing the
Delaware River. Its remaining outstanding indebtedness incurred in building the
toll bridges amounted in 1958 to $21,918,ooo; and in the same year, its operating
expenses for the five toll bridges were $859,599.62, which it paid out of receipts
totalling $877,264. The toll bridges required the services of 146 full-time people in
I958. The funds for the operation and maintenance of the free bridges are pro-
vided by state appropriation, and fifty-three additional employees were required in
1958 to staff them 5
All of these agencies have a single purpose: the construction, maintenance, and
operation of a single kind of public utility. By now their work has become rela-
tively routine in nature, and they can only look forward to a quiet future since,
barring amendment to the compacts which created them, they have fulfilled their
mandates. The two port authorities are an entirely different matter. Both are multi-
purpose, and they both can envisage an increasing scope of operations in the years
ahead.
The observation that four of the existing interstate authorities are small and
limited in their function does not mean that these authorities do not meet a peculiar
need and meet it well; or that they are not important to the party states. The evi-
dent usefulness and ability of the interstate authorities is strikingly illustrated by the
fact that no party state has exercised its option under any compacts to withdraw from
an authority. But beyond their activities, there is little unusual or different about them
that needs to be pointed out. A great deal more could, of course, be said about the
two port authorities, but even their operations fall immediately into fairly familiar
patterns. For basically, the authority device, when adapted for use by two or more
states, is the same in operation as when used by a single state or on the municipal
level. Since considerable attention is given elsewhere to the administrative principles
and techniques of the public authority in general, and to the Port of New York
Authority in particular, this paper will not be concerned with the details of interstate
authority operation. Rather, it will attempt first to draw some conclusions from
the experiences of the existing interstate authorities with regard to peculiar problems
involved in their use; it will then examine a number of interstate agencies which
are quasi-authority in nature and which, therefore, ought to be accorded some sort
of recognition in discussion of interstate authorities; and finally, it will deal with
the possibilities for and problems involved in the wider use of the interstate authority
device in the United States.
I
Somm PROBLEMS FACED BY INTERSTATE AuHoxRnm s
It is important to recall at the outset that by and large since its inception, the
authority movement has been confined to municipal and intrastate authorities.
'DLAwARE RIR JOINT TOLL BIDGE COMi'N ANN. REP. 6, 9 (x958). The 1959 and i96o reports
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Because there are so few interstate authorities-and because they involve so few
states 8-- very little attention has been paid to them by students in the field. The Port
of New York Authority is the only exception.7 Thus, no separate set of rules which
pertains to interstate authorities alone has been developed, nor have their operations
and functions been subjected to comparative analysis. The several interstate
authorities which have been established were each brought into being in response
to a unique set of problems. Each was the product of circumstances, not of theory.
Each has been a pioneer as far as its own development has been concerned. To be
sure, all six have common characteristics, but it is too early to be dogmatic in
describing on the basis of those characteristics the interstate public authority. They
are still too new and still too much in the process of becoming to have jelled into a
distinct category.
Study of the material available does, however, permit a number of conclusions
about interstate agencies as a type. One is impressed, first of all, by the fact that
the interstate authority has more often than not been ground reluctantly out of the
necessities of the case rather than adopted easily and early in the search for solution
to an interstate problem. Indeed, it appears that the common pattern has been for
the authority device to be used as a sort of last resort. Perhaps the most frustrating
aspect of the American system of government is the irrelevance of state lines to many
of the problems arising in the areas which they cross. Action by one state to solve
such problems can be rendered fruitless by inaction or different action by the other
states concerned. Yet cooperation is often hindered by the rigidity of state consti-
tutions and state laws as well as by conflicts along political and emotional lines.
After attempts to solve problems single-handedly have been foiled time and again,
the ad hoc solution of creating an authority has often been the only remaining
alternative. Certainly the Port of New York Authority was born out of desperation
over a seemingly hopeless impasse between New York and New Jersey over the
increasingly complex problem of transportation in the port area. It was accepted
finally as the only way remaining to settle the bitter wrangling and bickering that
had marred the relations between the two states. Although not as much is known
about the background of the other authorities, there seems to have been in most
cases there, too, a record of frustration and conflict which was finally brought to an
end by the establishment of the authority.
Perhaps because of the accumulation of ill will which built up between states
as they sought to solve common problems, once the authority device was finally
agreed upon as the solution, it was adopted only after a great deal of study. The
8New Jersey and Pennsylvania are the parties to the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission
and the Delaware River Port Authority; New York and New Jersey, to the New York Port Authority;
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states evidently wanted to be absolutely sure that what they were doing was right.
At least the history of the six interstate authorities now operative in the United
States reveals an impressively extensive preparation which preceded the establishment
of each of them. Julius Henry Cohen, the father of the Port of New York Authority
and its first general counsel, described the many steps involved in creating that
authority in his autobiography;' and although not all of the steps which he lists
have been taken in every case since then, by and large it would seem that the basic
process used by Cohen and his fellow-builders has become the standard for authority
establishment. Given a problem to be solved by the creation of an interstate
authority, Cohen concluded: "There is but one way to go about [doing] it practi-
cally, and that [is] to follow the experience in dealing with the problems of the
Port of New York. First, create a Study Commission, appoint upon it men who
would be expert in the various fields of knowledge involved; organize a staff of
competent engineers . . . and select some lawyers to work on the complex legal
problems in the situation; study the problem from all points of view" and base final
action upon their recommendations'
The process which Cohen here describes continues to be employed today. A
recent example is in the case of the proposed Missouri-Kansas Development Agency
for the Kansas City metropolitan area. The recommendation for the creation of
that Agency to build and operate both bridges and tunnels and drainage, water
supply, sewage, and garbage disposal facilities in the Kansas City area was the
product of a fifteen-month study conducted along the "Cohen Process" by the
Kansas City Metropolitan Area Planning Council." The Interstate-Federal Com-
pact Commission for the Delaware River Basin, which was just proposed in i96i,
is the result of probably the most thorough study ever made of an American river
basin. In 1955, the Governors of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Dela-
ware, and the Mayors of New York City and Philadelphia created the Delaware
River Basin Advisory Committee to review the water problem in the Basin. With
the help of a number of citizens in the area, the Committee established a Water
Resources Foundation for the Delaware River Basin. Financed by a grant of $131,000
from the Ford Foundation, the Water Research Foundation in turn asked the
Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University to make a study of the govern-
mental organization needed for water resources, planning, development, and opera-
tion in the Basin. The completed study, entitled The Problem of Water Resources
Administration," was presented to the Foundation on September x, 1959, and within
a year, a concrete proposal for the creation of an authority was before Congress and
the states. 3
' JULIUS H. COHEN, THEY BUILDED BETTER THAN THEY KNEW ch. 25, esp. 28x-85 (1946).
'Old. at 332.
"
1American City, May 1957, P. 171.
"2 Revised and published under the title, RosCOE C. MARTIN, RIVER BAsIN ADMINISTRATION AND THE
DELAWARE (i960).
"
5The story is told in some detail in WATER REsouRcEs FOUNDATION FOR THE DELAWARE RIvR BAsiN,
SPECIAL BULLETiN (i96i). See also, infra, text at notes 36-39.
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If the "Cohen Process" is still the basic way of establishing an authority, a
number of auxiliaries have been developed since i92o. Enough interstate authorities
have been created by now so that there is a considerable reservoir of experience upon
which those seeking to develop a new authority may draw. By doing so, they may
avoid some of the difficulties which plagued their predecessors. The Port of New
York Authority has been particularly generous in offering help and counsel. Even
more important, there now exists a body with expertise in the field of creating
interstate agencies, the Council of State Governments. No discussion of interstate
activities of any sort would be complete without mention of the Council. One of
its functions is to assist the states in solving interstate problems. It offers help in
conducting research, in drafting the interstate compacts on which authorities are
based, and in advising interstate agencies once they are established. And the Com-
missions on Interstate Cooperation, which are the Council's arms in the several
states, are available to help secure acceptance of the agency by state legislative and
executive officials.14 With all these services available today, there is no doubt that
the way of the authority-builder is much easier than it used to be.
Another conclusion which emerges from a study of the existing interstate
authorities is that it is necessary to base an authority on an interstate compact.
In Julius Henry Cohen's words: "It was clear that New York and New Jersey had
to be brought into binding cooperation. Hence, there would have to be a compact
between the two.' 5 An authority is basically an operating agency. It thus neces-
sarily will accumulate property for that purpose, and its revenues will probably be
derived from bonds secured by that property. It was obvious to Cohen, as it must
be to any student of interstate relations, that without a legal barrier to prevent it,
"Someday perhaps a legislature might change the policy of a State and dispose
of [its] interstate property... .-16 With a compact as its base, however, the authority
would be protected from such an action. For although there is still no precise
constitutional definition of the term, the consensus is that an interstate compact is a
contract, and because of the quasi-sovereign nature of the parties to a compact, it is
regarded as a more formal and weighty commitment than a contract involving
private persons.' Indeed, the Supreme Court has held in the landmark case of
West Virgina ex rel. Dyer v. Sims'8 that the delegation by compact of power to an
interstate agency amounts to an irrevocable commitment, at least where there is no
specific state constitutional provision prohibiting such delegation. A state generally
may not, the Court has declared, withdraw from a compact on the grounds that
the delegation was, after all, contrary to her constitution, for she has entered into a
contractual obligation not lightly to be broken. And the late Mr. Justice Jackson
stated in his concurring opinion in the same case: "West Virginia, for internal
affairs, is free to interpret her own Constitution as she will. But if the Compact
"See Zimmerman & Leach, The Commissions on Interstate Cooperation, 33 STATE Gov. 233 (i96o).
Ir CoHEN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 290. (Emphasis added.)
16 Ibid.
11 Cf. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
:8 341 U.S. 22 (1950).
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system is to have vitality and integrity, she may not (retroactively) raise an issue of
ultra vires, decide it, and release herself from an interstate obligation."' 9 As a result
of this decision, interstate agencies may operate on a permanent basis, once they are
established, and the Supreme Court can be expected to sustain the compacts creating
them whenever they are attacked on the grounds of technical defects under the
internal constitutional law of a member state which were not apparent at the time
of the Congressional approval of the compact. Of course, a state may withdraw
from the compact in accordance with the procedure set out therein, but for the
duration of the compact, she cannot forsake the agency.
Moreover, establishment through a compact assures easier and more effective
administration, since one body will be created to serve as the compact's administrative
arm, rather than two or more separate commissions operating in each of the party
states.
For both these reasons, compacts have become a basic ingredient of the interstate
authority recipe. This, however, has not proved to be an unmixed blessing. For the
compact device involves difficulties of its own. Not only are compacts often hard
to formulate, but they are also often difficult to get ratified. Congress, which must
generally give its consent,2 ° has not been as hospitable towards compacts as might
be expected,2 1 and often what sounds eminently reasonable to the negotiators of a
compact may fail to impress a state legislature at all. And once in force, compacts
are often hard to amend. Thus, although it was obvious to the Illinois legislature as
early as 1953, when it approved authorizing legislation, that the Bi-State Develop-
ment Compact needed to be amended in order to make the Bi-State Development
Agency truly an effective instrument of government, the Missouri legislature was
not convinced of the same necessity until 1959. In the intervening six years, the
Agency operated with much less return to the states than it might have. Moreover,
compacts are sometimes hard to enforce, existing as they do in a sort of no-man's
land between the regular administrative agencies of the party states. Except in
extremis, judicial enforcement has little to recommend it.
It is true that these disadvantages of compacts are present for whatever purpose
the compacts are used. But they are particularly important in the case of authorities
because of the operational nature of their "compactual" mandates. The need for
amendment, for example, of a compact creating a recommendatory or study agency
may not be as confining as the same need in the case of a compact creating an
operating authority. In the latter case, for full effectiveness, the limitations imposed
on the actions of the authority must necessarily be overcome. The history of the
interstate authorities in the United States reveals enough examples of the necessity of
changing compacts as new situations or conditions not covered in the original
compact have arisen, to indicate that the problem is a real one. The jurisdiction,
' 1d. at 35.
20 ".. no State shall, without the consent of Congress. . . enter into any agreement or compact with
another State ..... U.S. CONsr. art. i, § o.t See Leach, The Status of Interstate Compacts Today, 32 STArE Gov. 134 (1959). See also Leach,
The Federal Government and Interstate Compacts, 29 FoRanma L. R. 421 (ig6i).
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duties, and powers of the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission, which
was established by compact in 1934, have several times had to be enlarged since
then in order to keep the Commission fully effective. Similarly, several years of
trying to work under the original compact creating the Bi-State Development
Agency convinced both the Agency staff and finally the legislatures of the two party
states that a number of modifications in the compact were necessary if the Agency
was to carry out its functions properly. The compact creating the Lake Champlain
Bridge Commission, adopted in 1927, has been amended five times, most recently
in 1958. Other examples could be cited. The moral of the story probably is that
special care is necessary in drawing up authority compacts; and that they should be
examined from time to time for assurance that their terms still enable the authority
to function efficiently.
Perhaps the biggest problem facing interstate authorities, once the compact
has been drawn and ratified and they have become operative, is the problem of
identifying themselves and relating their work to the rest of the governmental
machinery in the party states. Indeed, Cohen might well have added one further
step to his procedure to develop an interstate authority-the need to seek political
and administrative, to say nothing of public, acceptance of the device. Too often,
an authority, once established, has been left unrelated to the activities of regular
state departments and agencies. Only a few states have done anything to tie their
interstate agencies formally to their regular administrative organization. In
Missouri, the Bi-State Development Agency and the Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Commission have been brought under the state Department of Business and Ad-
ministration. But that is about as far as the movement has gone. And even in
Missouri, it must be said, the connection thus provided evidently did not succeed in
bringing those agencies into a very close relationship with the rest of the state
government. At least, the Governor's Office was unaware in the spring of 1961
either that the offices of the Bi-State Development Agency in St. Louis had been
moved several months before, or that the Agency had acquired a new Executive
Director. Most of the states have simply ignored their interstate agencies altogether.
As a result of their unclear, in-between sort of status in the state administrative
setup, interstate authorities operate with considerable freedom. Perhaps because the
authorities do not ordinarily make demands upon the state treasuries and because
they confine their activities to specialized fields of endeavor, the states have not sought
to impose strict controls on them. All compacts become part of the law of each
party state upon ratification, and all compact agencies thus automatically become
agencies of each state. Because they do, devices for control, supervision, and di-
rection which may be brought to bear upon intrastate agencies may also be brought
to bear on interstate authorities, except where the compact provides otherwise. The
compacts creating authorities are full of additional provisions designed to enable
the states to restrain them in action-reporting provisions, the requirement that the
authority's books be made available for inspection or audit by authorized repre-
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sentatives of the state or by private auditing firms, a veto power over the authority's
actions vested in the governor, provisions for removal of officers found guilty oE
malfeasance in office, the requirement of legislative approval of comprehensive and.
supplemental plans, and still others. Despite the availability of this arsenal of
possible controls, however, the states by and large leave the authorities they have
created alone.
To some extent, of course, this freedom is desirable. Indeed, part of the
justification for creating an authority in preference to some other governmental
device is to gain just such freedom. But that very freedom necessitates care on the:.
part of each authority to relate itself to the people and to the officials of the party
states in order to allay fears that the authority is inimical to the democratic process.
Even at the outset, this problem was recognized. Julius Henry Cohen, in talking-
about the early days of the Port of New York Authority, remarked that it was
generally felt when that agency was first created that the word "authority" must
have been chosen with malice aforethought, that it "must mean a supergovernment!
We became a sort of Halloween spectre to the municipal officials of all the cities.
within the [Port] District . . . ready to capture all the little children, push them.
into our oven and make gingerbread out of them. 22  In an attempt to dispel
this belief, the Port Authority early developed an extensive public relations program.
Much of its later success can be attributed to the work of Mrs. Belle Moskowitz, its,
first public relations counsellor 3
The experience of the Port Authority has been repeated with each of the other-
interstate authorities. Unrelated to the rest of the state machinery, they have had to.
make themselves known to the public as a whole, and to develop for themselves,
whatever relations with the party governments seemed necessary or practical.
Through brochures, by making their staff available for speeches and public appear-
ances, and by taking the initiative in developing personal ties with legislators and.
executive officials in the states, the authorities have gradually become known and-
have been accorded some degree of recognition as public agencies both in and out.
of government circles. These public relations programs have been more successful int
bringing about closer contact with and awareness of the interstate authorities in the
executive than in the legislative branches of the states, where size and turnover make
the problem of education much more difficult. In no state, however, even in the
executive branch, has a single official or department been specifically charged with
maintaining liaison with the interstate authorities to which that state is party, despite
the fact that in law every authority is a state instrumentality of each of the party
states, and that it is a basic principle of public administration that some line of
control should link all the units of a single administrative system. Although
numerous contacts have been established, this has been achieved through the actior
of the authority rather than by the efforts of the states. Not only are these contacts
22 COHEN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 291.
'I1d. at 248-49.
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thus unilateral, but they are also haphazard, depending upon individual empathy for
the most part.
It is hard to assay the effect on the authorities of existence in an administrative
limbo, and of having to blow their own horns for attention. There is no doubt that
some of the resources of the authorities which might otherwise be devoted to pro-
gram activities are diverted to public relations instead. There is always the danger
that in such a unilateral arrangement, abuse will grow and develop. It is re-
assuring to note, however, that in the one instance where abuses did develop-in
the case of the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commissioners who appropriated
Commission funds to their own uses-the matter was handled quickly and efficiently
by the governors and courts of the party states.24 At the least, the ambiguous position
of interstate authorities in the administrative setup creates a continuing problem in
the effective accomplishment of their program goals. At the same time, it presents
a challenge to students of public administration and to the officers of states party to
an interstate authority, a challenge which should soon be both accepted and reduced
to size.
II
INTERsTATE QuAsI-Aumoliuns
The true authority, Austin J. Tobin insists,2" is self supporting, and Mr. Tobin's
rule is generally accepted as correct, and has been followed in part one. But total self-
support is perhaps too much to require of an authority. Even the Port of New
York Authority launched its program with appropriations from the states (which
it later paid back in full); and the Lake Champlain Bridge Commission not only
was advanced $2ooooo by its parent states at the outset, but later received a PWA
grant of $343,13o.63 in addition.26 There are undoubtedly many interstate problems
for the solution of which a self-supporting authority operation is the obvious answer.
It is equally likely, however-and indeed often the case-that states may want
to join in attacking a problem but wish to refrain from creating a financially in-
dependent unit of government as their instrument. To define the public authority
too rigidly serves to make its several advantages less than freely available to the
states. It would seem preferable to adopt a more comprehensive definition en-
compassing agencies financed in a variety of ways.
If this broader definition be used, there are a number of interstate agencies which
while they do not meet the self-support test, nevertheless are to some degree in-
dependent in terms of support; and which meet the other generally accepted quali-
fications for an authority in that they are "set up outside the regular framework of
... government ... freed from the procedures and restrictions of routine govern-
ment operations and [managed according to] the best techniques of private
management... ."" Because these agencies perform important governmental func-
"
4
DELAWARE RIvR JOINT TOLL BRIDGE COm.'N ANN. REP. ix (i958).
" AUSTIN J. TOBN, AUTHORITIES AS A GOVERNMENTAL TECHNIQUE 15 (953).
" LAxE CHAmpt.Aw BRiDGE CoMM'N AUDITOR's REP. 2 (1960).
'
T TOBIN, op. cit. supra note 25, at 15.
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tions and because they are at least of a quasi-authority character, they must be in-
cluded in a discussion of interstate authorities.
The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, for example, is supported
by the assessments which it makes on employers of persons licensed and registered
under the terms of the compact. Although it operates thirteen employment informa-
tion centers in the New York waterfront area, it is not a business enterprise
in the sense that it operates a public work or facility. Rather, it performs what is
basically a police function for the party states. It does so independently of regular
political controls, with its own personnel and procedures, and at no cost to the state
treasuries. Only because it does operate in this way-only because it is, in other
words, essentially an authority-has it been able to cope successfully with the problem
of crime on the New York waterfront. For the Commission, since it began to
operate in 1953, has succeeded where every one else had failed for half a century.
The dramatic reduction of theft and violence on the docks, the abolition of the
notorious "shape-up," the elimination of extortion by "public loading"--all these
have come about as a result of the Commission's efforts. It is generally credited
with making an outstanding contribution to the welfare of the citizens not only of
New York and New Jersey, but to that of everyone who uses the New York docks. s
Similarly, the Breaks Interstate Park Commission of Virginia and Kentucky
and the Palisades Interstate Park Commission of New York and New Jersey, both
financed chiefly through legislative appropriations and gifts, would not be classifiable
as authorities under a narrow definition of that term. But if judged by their opera-
tions, they are both authorities.
Although the compact creating the Breaks Interstate Park Commission provides
that the cost of developing the park may be defrayed by the issuance of revenue
bonds, the states have not chosen to use that power. Instead, much of the land
under development was donated to the Commission, and its day to day work is
wholly paid for on a fifty-fifty basis by appropriations from the legislatures of the
two states. But the Park Commissioners have full control of all aspects of park
development and operation, and political strife has been avoided completely to
date.20 As of 1961, a park of 1,625 acres had been developed, and plans were in the
making for the addition of another 2,375 acres. The area in which the park is
located is one rich in legend and colorful pioneer history. When it is completed,
it will provide a variety of recreational facilities for the residents of the entire
southwestern corner of Virginia and of Eastern Kentucky.
Unlike the Breaks Commission, the Palisades Interstate Park Commission has no
independent borrowing power of its own. It receives its income from a combina-
tion of sources: appropriations, gifts, income from its facilities, the proceeds of bond
issues floated by the party states, and voluntary state services. The Commission is
free, however, to plan, develop, maintain, govern, and manage the Park as it sees
fit; freed from the restrictions imposed by either state on its own state agencies; and
2 8 LEcH & SuOG, op. cit. supra note x, at 187-195.
The Breaks Interstate Park, The Commonwealth, Oct. 1957, P. 17.
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,entirely beyond the machinations of local politics. It now operates what is un-
•doubtedly one of the finest park systems in the United States, comprising some
53,ooo acres along the Palisades of the Hudson, and providing recreational outlets for
-the millions of people in the New York metropolitan area0 °
In addition to the agencies which we have designated quasi-authorities because of
-the ways by which they are financed, there are other interstate agencies which are
.authorities in name but are quasi-authorities in fact because of the kind of functions
they actually perform. Students of the authority agree generally that the device is
-to be used "for the management of public enterprise," which, defined specifically,
includes ports, bridges, tunnels, toll roads, terminals, markets, airports, housing
-projects, and public utilities.3 ' However, at least two important interstate agencies,
-while endowed by their compacts with operating powers and thus technically quali-
fed as authorities, have in practice made little or no use of those powers. In terms of
-function, they would thus be described as study and recommendatory agencies.3 2
'These two agencies are the Bi-State Development Agency and the Southern Regional
'Education Board.
The Bi-State Development Agency was created by compact between Illinois and
:Missouri in 1949 to provide "cooperation in the future planning and development
.of the St. Louis metropolitan area."33  Although it was authorized by the compact
-to own and operate bridges, tunnels, airports, wharves, docks and harbors, ware-
liouses and other storage facilities, grain elevators, sewage disposal plants, and pas-
senger transportation and terminal facilities, it has so far emphasized in its work the
-planning and recommendatory function. Its Mississippi River Pollution Survey, its
Bighway and Expressway Survey, and its St. Louis County Sewer Survey are all
-nasterpieces of their kind. All of them were financed by grants to the Agency, and
-the Agency confined its role to facilitating action on the recommendations embodied
in the various surveys by local and state governmental units. Indeed, the Agency
"has purposely kept itself small, and has adopted the policy of using outside con-
:sultants and acting through contracts with other organizations rather than of de-
-veloping an operational staff of its own.34 Even when it set out to develop a
.4,2oo,ooo bushel grain elevator adjacent to its wharf, it did so by contract with
-the Illinois Grain Corporation rather than on its own. So far the only facility
'built for the Agency's own operation-financed by revenue bonds-has been the
'Granite City Wharf, the construction of which cost $1,5oo,ooo. Although the Agency
,enjoys the power to borrow money, it has so far preferred to operate without using
this power. There is a possibility that the Agency might take over the mass transit
"
0For a description both of the Park and its operation facilities, see PALIsuEs INTERSTATE PARK
,CoMM'N, 6o YEARS OF PARK COOPERATION (596o).
"1 See, e.g., address by Austin J. Tobin, The Public Authority--An Aid to Economic Development,
,delivered to the Economic Development Institute, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1956, New York Port
-Authority Release, p. x.
" See LEACH & SuGG, op. cit. supra note r, at 18-2o.
"'THE BI-STATE DEvELoPmENT AGENCY, MISSOURI-ILLINOIS METROPOLITAN Dism=r i (xg6o).
" Letter from Col. R. E. Smyser, Jr., Exec. Dir., Bi-State Development Agency, to Richard H. Leach,
-April 3, 1961.
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lines in the St. Louis area. If it should, of course, it would acquire a major op-
erating function. The Board of Commissioners of the Agency, however, has not yet
decided on the matter. Even with its recently added operational activities, the major
contribution of the Agency to the St. Louis area will probably remain for some time
the vigorous leadership it has given to area-wide planning.
The compact establishing the Southern Regional Education Board, now sub-
scribed to by sixteen southern states, speaks of "the establishment, acquisition,
operation and maintenance of regional educational schools and institutions for the
benefit of the respective states.""3 The framers of the compact, in fact, were confident
that this would be the primary function of the Board. However, the Board itself at
its first meeting adopted by-laws which emphasized working with existing, accredited
colleges and universities in the region, thus obviating the necessity of creating and
operating new regional institutions. And it has not deviated from that policy since.
Thus the Board is not an authority, not because it cannot serve as an operating agency
engaged in a "public enterprise," but because it has chosen to work in the planning
and research areas and leave the actual operation of educational institutions in the
hands of existing colleges and universities in the southern region.
The most recent interstate agency may also not turn out to be an authority.
The Delaware River Basin Commission is charged in general with the management
and control of the water and related natural resources of the 12,75o square mile
Delaware River Basin. Specifically, it is to "develop and effectuate plans, policies
and projects relating to the water resources of the basin. It shall adopt and
promote uniform and coordinated policies for water conservation, control, use and
management in the basin. It shall encourage the planning, development and
financing of water resources projects according to such plans and policies. '3'  As
the compact reads, the Commission's chief concern will be with developing a com-
prehensive plan for basin development, and with providing common direction to the
"operations of the 19 Federal agencies and approximately 6o State agencies which
are concerned to some degree with the water resources of the basin. . . ."' The
Commission's activities would be financed by appropriations, grants, and loans;
indeed, the longest section of the compact deals with capital financing 8 It is thus
possible that the Commission's activities may extend into the operating field.
Several specific provisions in a number of articles grant the Commission power to
construct and operate facilities. For example, article 4, which deals with water
supply, says in part: "The commission shall have power to develop, implement and
effectuate plans and projects for the use of the waters of the basin.... To this end,
without limitation thereto,39 it may provide for, construct, acquire, operate and
maintain dams, reservoirs and other facilities ... " And article 5, dealing with
:5 SOUTHERN REGIONAL EDUCATION COMPACT art. I.
a INTERSTATE-FFDItAL COMPACt, DELAWARE RnER BAsiN art. 3, § I, 75 Stat. 688, 692 (Sept. 27,
x961).
n7 I08 CONG. REC. 1768 (daily ed. Feb. i, I961).
:8 INTERSTATE-FEDERAL CoMpAcT, op. cit. supra nOte 36, art. 12, 75 Stat. 688, 702-05 (Sept. 27, g6i).
'1d. art. 4, 75 Stat. 688, 695-96 (Sept. 27, 1961). (Emphasis added.)
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pollution control, repeats almost the same phraseology, as does article 8, dealing
with recreation. The latter article declares that "the commission shall provide
for the development of water related public sports and recreational facilities.
The Commission on its own account or in cooperation with a signatory party ...
may provide for the construction, maintenance, and administration of such facili-
ties...."
Only time will tell what the proposed Commission will in fact become. It seems
likely, however, that it will follow at first at least the pattern established by the Bi-
State Development Agency and the Southern Regional Education Board, and
emphasize its planning and coordination functions rather than the operational
function. The development of the comprehensive plan will obviously be the first
task which the Commission will undertake.
Such interstate agencies are thus hybrids-they are authorities and they are not.
And the same moral should be drawn here as with regard to variations in financing:
it is good that this is so. For surely, for its full effectiveness, the authority device
should be kept flexible in operation and adaptable in purpose. The proper course of
action would seem to be the creation of interstate agencies under compactual man-
dates which do not obligate them to embark at once upon a specific enterprise or
enterprises, but which nevertheless enable them to do so if needs be. Established in
this way, such agencies can be of greater value to the party states than authorities
narrowly restricted from the outset to a specific kind of operation, because only the
former can grow and change in response to changing needs.
II1
INTmESTATE AUr-soiurnS: FuTuRE PRosPF-cTs
There are good reasons to believe that the interstate authority has a very bright
future. Indeed, it appears that the peculiar concatenation of circumstances which
justifies the establishment of interstate authorities is arising ever more frequently, and
that an increase in their number can be expected in the years ahead. It is in fact
quite possible that the interstate authority will become the most common type of
interstate body in the United States.
For by and large, the conditions which have brought about the creation of the
most important interstate authorities to date are the product of increased urbaniza-
tion-the result, in short, of the growth of metropolitan areas in this country. It is
not mere coincidence that the first interstate authority to be created in the United
States was the Port of New York Authority, or that the Port of London Au-
thori#y was its predecessor. Both were brought into being in order to solve
problems arising in rapidly growing urban areas. The same is true of the Bi-State
-Development Agency and the proposed Delaware River Basin Commission. To-
day, the steadily and rapidly growing concentration of two-thirds of the nation's
population into 192 metropolitan -areas is perhaps the most dramatic event on the
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American scene, and unless all the prognostications about future population growth
in the United States are wrong, the future holds only a continuation of the process.
Metropolitanization brings in its wake a host of administrative problems related
to the services performed for urban residents by state and local governments. Luther
Gulick recently described the compound of problems resulting from the new metro-
politan way of living as a problem in discontent:"
People are not satisfied with their homes and housing, with their trip to and from work,
and with the aggravations, costs and delays of traffic and parking. They are distraught
by the lack of schools and recreational facilities for their children and themselves, and they
are concerned by ... neighborhood conditions, youthful delinquency and crime. People
find shopping difficult and more regimented, and the ever more needed services hard to
get and expensive. They struggle with water shortages, with bad drainage, and sewer
conditions, with dirt and noise which they don't like. They find the city centers 'old style,'
inconvenient, dismal and repulsive and the old buses, streetcars, trains and other methods
of mass movement uncomfortable and slow.... And when people move to the suburbs
and take work in a new suburban factory, store or other enterprise, they find that many
of the evils they sought to escape move in right after them, with mounting taxes to plague
them there too.
Obviously, population shifts on such a vast scale make unprecedented demands on
the resources of governmental units in urban areas. Unfortunately, this comes at
a time when governments in metropolitan centers are still trying to solve the
problems of their earlier growth. Already, millions of urban residents live in sub-
standard housing; their children are packed into old-fashioned schools; they drive
on narrow and crowded streets; and they are served by inadequate mass transporta-
tion, water and sewage facilities. In the face of these combined demands-to elim-
inate the evils of the past and to prevent their future occurrence-there is hardly a city
in the nation that has the economic resources to launch a successful attack on metro-
politan problems by itself.
Hard-pressed urban communities can, of course, turn to the states for help; and
there are a number of things which states can do to alleviate urban problems 1 But
their financial resources are limited, too. The tax advantage lies ever more with the
federal government. This has meant for the states a contracting area of potential
tax sources with which to meet an expanding number of demands. In fact, the tax
situation alone raises considerable doubt whether a state, acting alone, could
sufficiently help its urban areas solve their problems.
Faced thus with a metropolitan situation increasingly demanding attention, and in-
adequate resources with which to meet it, the states may well turn to joint action as
a way out. They may, in other words, seek to develop the interstate authority as at
least a partial answer to the problem of financing necessary metropolitan programs.
For even a cursory study of the nation's metropolitan areas reveals that many of these,
"0 LUTHER GULICK, Problems of United States Economic Development, in PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT I, 2 (i958).
" ROBERT H. CONNERY & RICHARD H. LEACH, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND METROPOLITAN AREAs
130-31- 194-95) 199, 223 (I960).
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among them some of the most important urban centers, are not within the jurisdiction
of any one state. Some fifty key metropolitan areas either extend across state boundary
lines or border very closely thereon. The St. Louis, Kansas City, Youngstown,
Huntington-Ashland, Cincinnati, and New York areas are but a few scattered
examples. Even in 195o, one out of every four Americans lived in an interstate area,
and the proportion is still higher today. Speculating on the implications of these
facts, Daniel R. Grant concluded that "with the bulk of our population increase
presently taking place in the suburban fringes of metropolitan areas, there may well
be more people living in interstate metropolitan areas than in intrastate cities of all
sizes within the next generation or two." If Professor Grant's conclusion is
correct-and all the evidence points that way-the authority device will no doubt
become increasingly attractive to states plagued with metropolitan problems.
It is not difficult to suggest problem areas for authorities. Almost every rapidly
urbanizing center suffers to some degree from a lack of sufficient water. Increased
urbanization brings with it problems of water pollution and sewage and waste
disposal on such a vast scale that the House Committee on Public Works estimated
that municipal pollution abatement fund requirements between 1955 and 1965 alone
would total $5-33 billion 43 Air pollution, although a relatively new phenomenon,
has already reached alarming proportions in many urban areas. Most metropolitan
areas suffer from the inability of old mass transit systems to handle present traffic, to
say nothing of meeting future transportation requirements. Parking and highway
problems offer further challenges. In solving one or all of these problems, the
use of an authority-of the planning and recommendatory or the operating type, or,
as suggested above, combining both functions-presents interesting possibilities. In-
deed, in a recent discussion of financing urban public works, Mabel Walker declared
that "the case for an interstate . . . agency is stronger than [the case] for an agency
that carries on all its activities within one state."" As an answer to financing
many of the services needed in metropolitan areas now and in the future, the
authority seems to have a great deal to recommend it.
The authority solution, however, must not be regarded as a panacea for inter-
state problems. Too frequent recourse to the single purpose authority succeeds only
in fragmenting functions which by their very nature ought to be integrated on an
area-wide basis. Even multiple purpose authorities are subject to the same malady.
Thus the Port of New York Authority does not deal with all aspects of transpor-
tation in the New York metropolitan area. It is not concerned, for example, with
railroad transportation or with traffic in New York City, both vital parts of the over-
all transportation problem in the area. Moreover, there is little doubt that the special
district, of which the interstate authority is but one type, further weakens and
"'Grant, The Government of Interstate Metropolitan Areas, 8 WErr. POL. Q. 90 (x955). The entire
article is well worth reading in this connection.
"House Comm. on Public Works, Extending and Strengthening the Water Pollution Control Act,
;H.R. REP. No. =590, 84 th Cong., 2d Ses. 3 (1956).
"Walker, The Authority Device for Planning Public Works, Tax Policy, Dec. 1958, p. 4.
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subdivides citizen interest in government, which is already so low on the state and
local level as to cause concern to those interested in the continued vitality of the
democratic system 5 Finally, an authority should of course not be used to displace
effectively functioning state or local agencies. It is designed primarily to enable
states to meet problems of planning, coordination, and financing, and it should be
used accordingly.3
One objection to the use of the authority device can easily be disposed of. That
is the charge that authorities act irresponsibly and are particularly subject to abuse,
being offshore from the terra firma of ordinary political controls47 There is very
little on the record to justify such misgivings. On the contrary, the performance
record at least of the existing interstate authorities is such that it demands respect
for their efficiency and responsiveness to the needs of the areas which they serve.48
Only one authority-the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission-has ever
shown any signs of irresponsible action, and that authority took steps to clean its
own house. An authority, interstate or local, like any governmental agency, will
reflect in its operations the caliber of its leaders. One but needs to glance at the
names of the members of the Port of New York Authority, of the Delaware River
Port Authority, or of any of the other interstate authorities, to know that the
agency's business is in good hands. Indeed, study of the operations and programs
of the several authorities discussed herein yields the conclusion that there are few
governmental agencies in the United States which are better administered-i.e,
administered from the point of view of the public interest. That is to say a great
deal.
Regarded properly, the authority device should be an alternative available to
the states when they seek freedom to develop joint solutions to common problems
outside the regular framework of state government. The possibility of that
alternative exists because the federal system is flexible enough to accommodate
options other than action by individual states or by the federal government. Thus
far, the interstate authority alternative has not been widely used. The efficiency
with which the few existing interstate authorities are now meeting their assigned
responsibilities, and the increasing number of interstate problems which demand
cooperative action for their solution both seem to suggest, however, that far greater
use may be made of the device in the years ahead. If this should turn out to be the
case, all the evidence presently available leads to the conclusion that the future
will see the interstate authority come to occupy an important place in the pattern
of American government.
"See Downgrading the Authorities, American City, Nov. 1956, p. 5.
"See Gerwig, Public Authorities: Legislative Panacea, 5 J. PUB. L. 391 (r956).
"This argument is forcefully put in Cameron, Whose Authority?, Atlantic Monthly, Aug. 1959,
p. 38.
4' See Leach, Interstate Agencies and Effective Administration, 34 STATE Gov. 199 (Ig6i).
